We introduce the foundational issues involved in incorporating the Negation as Failure (NAF) rule into the framework of rst-order hereditary Harrop formulae of Miller et al. This is a larger class of formulae than Horn clauses, and so the technicalities are more intricate than in the Horn clause case. As programs may grow during execution in this framework, the role of NAF and the Closed World Assumption (CWA) need some modi cation, and for this reason we introduce the notion of a completely de ned predicate, which may be thought of as a localisation of the CWA. We also show how this notion may be used to de ne a notion of NAF for a more general class of goals than literals alone. We also show how an extensional notion of universal quanti cation may be incorporated. This makes our framework somewhat di erent from that of Miller et al., but not essentially so. We also show how to construct a Kripke-like model for the extended class of programs. This is essentially a denotational semantics for logic programs, in that it provides a mapping from the program to a pair of sets of atoms which denote the success and ( nite) failure sets. This is inspired by the work of Miller on the semantics of rst-order hereditary Harrop formulae. Note that no restriction on the class of programs is needed in this approach, and that our construction needs no more than ! iterations. This necessitates a slight departure from the standard methods, but the important properties of the construction still hold.
Introduction
The standard way to infer negative information from a logic program is to use the Negation as Failure (NAF) rule; that is, :A succeeds if A fails 2, 16] . Clearly then the notions of success and failure will be mutually dependent in a logic programming system using the NAF rule. The standard example of such a system is the class of normal programs, in which the body of each clause is a conjunction of literals. The notions of success and failure are determined operationally via the notion of an SLDNF-derivation 12] , in that an atom succeeds if it has a successful SLDNF-derivation, and ( nitely) fails if all SLDNF-derivations are nitely failed. An SLDNF-derivation may be thought of as being induced by the notion of an SLD-derivation, in that a literal :A succeeds if every SLDNF-derivation of A is nitely failed, and so the success of :A is determined by the failure of A. Thus the notion of an SLDor SLDNF-derivation may be used to form two judgements: one that a given literal succeeds (as the derivation is successful) and the other that a given literal fails (as all derivations are nitely failed). Whilst Horn clauses are Turing-complete 18], there is considerable interest in extending the basic formalism to include more expressive constructs than is permitted in the Horn clause framework. However, it is not always clear how the NAF rule may be applied in some of these extensions. For example, for systems in which programs may grow and/or shrink during execution 7, 13, 14, 15] , the notion of failure may change with time due to changes in the program, and so the notion of negation may change. As pointed out in 7], this does not coincide with the usual notion of negation in mathematical logic, essentially because the NAF rule is not monotonic; that is, if P`:A, then it does not necessarily follow that P 0`: A where P P 0 . Hence, the treatment of NAF in such systems requires careful analysis.
Another point of interest is that the notion of failure for an existentially quanti ed goal should presumably imply something about the success of a universally quanti ed goal. As some logic programming systems 15] allow universally quanti ed formulae as goals, it would seem that such systems provide a framework pertinent to the study of NAF, in that the notion of success for a universally quanti ed goal should be the dual, in some sense, of the notion of success for an existentially quanti ed goal.
In this paper we explore such issues of success and failure for a class of formulae known as hereditary Harrop formulae 15]. Such formulae permit both universal and existential quanti ers as well as implications in goal formulae, making the treatment of the NAF rule in this system rather intricate. Whilst our treatment stresses the role of negation, we also discuss the notion of success for universally quanti ed goals, and show how there are (at least) two such notions which are of interest, which may be classi ed as intensional and extensional. The main di erence is that the latter one may use knowledge about the language of the program in order to make inferences, whereas the former may not. Whilst the former approach is the \standard" method used in mathematical logic, the latter one seems most appealing from a logic programming point of view, as it is quite common to assume that all terms come from a known set, known as the Herbrand Universe.
An interesting consequence of this discussion is that for the extensional notion of universal quanti cation to be feasible, it seems natural to consider not only the ground instances of the program (which is common practice in logic programming semantics) but also instances of the program which may contain variables. As we shall see, this essentially requires that the success of universally quanti ed goals be \compact", in that the success of the quanti ed goal depends on the success of only a nite number of instances of the goal. Hence, the failure of an existentially quanti ed goal is similarly compact, and so no more than ! iterations are needed to decide the truth of a given goal. This contrasts with the standard notion of failure in logic programming semantics. For example, consider the program q 9x:p(x) 8x p(f(x)) p(x) p(a) If, as is the standard practice, we only consider the ground instances of the program, then in order to come to the conclusion that q fails it is necessary to perform ! iterations (such as the P operator of Fitting 4] ) to determine that p(t) succeeds for every ground term t, and hence ! + 1 iterations to determine that 9x:p(x) (and hence q) fails. However, if we consider all instances of the program, and not just the ground instances, we nd that after ! iterations there are still instances of p(x) which have not been shown to fail, and 9x:p(x) does not fail in this case. Hence, a more subtle analysis of the notion of success and failure, which is required for the incorporation of universally quanti ed goals, may shed some interesting light on the notion of failure for normal programs.
Another issue of some technical signi cance is the use of the NAF rule in the presence of implications in goals. As the execution of such goals may involve adding clauses to the program, the notion of failure may change during execution, making the use of the NAF rule somewhat more intricate. As we shall see, this will involve the notion of a completely de ned predicate, i.e. one for which it will be safe to apply the NAF rule, as we assume that such predicates should not be extended.
Having introduced these operational notions, it seems natural to turn to the question of a corresponding model-theoretic notion of consequence. Traditionally in logic programming this has been done by means of a continuous operator on a complete lattice, which thus has a least xed point. This xed point is then used as a \canonical" model of the program, in that an atom A is a (proof-theoretic) consequence of the program i A is true in this model.
Hence, we may think of this approach as a denotational semantics for logic programs, in that given a program P, this construction provides us with a method of nding a set of atoms which may be considered as the \meaning" of the program, in that the program is considered to be a shorthand for this set of atoms. Given that a construction along these lines has been given by Miller 14] for a large fragment of hereditary Harrop formulae, it would seem that such xed point methods would be appropriate for our task.
One point to note is that in the case when NAF is involved, we generally wish to think of the denotational semantics of the program as two sets of atoms | one for the set of atoms which succeeds, and the other for the set of atoms which ( nitely) fails. Hence our approach should presumably be more in the spirit of the three-valued approaches 4, 10]. Thus our construction will be similar in spirit to that of 14], but will be somewhat more intricate, as there is more than one set of atoms involved. We de ne a T P operator in the traditional way, and it is not hard to show that the operator involved is in fact continuous, but only on a complete semi-lattice, rather than a complete lattice. This makes it less than trivial to nd the least xed point of this operator, but it is still straightforward. We then show that the model-theoretic notion of consequence corresponds with the operational one, a result which may be interpreted as showing the \compactness" of the operational notion.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the foundational issues involved in adding negation to the framework of rst-order hereditary Harrop formulae, and we discuss our motivation for interpreting universal quanti ers extensionally, as well as the role of the Negation as Failure (NAF) rule in our setting. In section 3 we present the formal extensions necessary to incorporate the above features, and de ne a notion of operational provability. We then consider model-theoretic issues { in particular the problem of nding a model-theoretic notion of consequence which corresponds to the proof-theoretic one introduced above. In Section 4 we discuss the framework of 14], on which our work is based, and the preliminary technicalities of our approach, and in the following section we de ne the appropriate notion of consequence and present some basic results. In Section 6 we present our xed point construction, and show that it indeed captures the notion of consequence we desire. Finally in Section 7 we present our conclusions and discuss some possibilities for further work.
Preliminaries
The de nitions of D and G formulae given in 15] are as follows:
The addition of negated atoms to goals requires that we extend the de nition of a G formula to include the case :A. The de nition of the G formulae which re ects this is given below.
De nition 2.1 A de nite formula D and a goal formula G are de ned via:
We denote by D the set of all D formulae, and the set of all G formulae by G. In order to avoid confusion with the class of formulae of 14], we will refer to such de nite and goal formulae as D HHF ? and G HHF ? formulae respectively.
There are two important points to note about the use of this class of formulae as a logic programming language.
Firstly, one feature of logic programming is that we usually consider the set of all closed terms, called the Herbrand Universe and which is here denoted as U, as a set which is xed prior to the writing of a program, and hence is constant throughout the computation process. For simplicity, we assume that the Herbrand Universe is not empty. We usually think of this set of terms as being generated by a nite number of symbols, i.e. a signature, and so it seems natural to associate a signature with a particular program. Often the signature of a program is taken to contain exactly the function and constant symbols which appear in the program. In our case we will assume that the signature must contain such symbols, but need not be limited to them. For example, consider the program below.
8x non zero(s(x))
It is clear that non zero(s n (0)) succeeds for all n 1, and that non zero(0) fails. Clearly we wish the latter goal to fail, rather than produce a type error or something similar. Hence we need the external knowledge provided by the signature in order to have the correct \view" of the information in the program. This also makes it clear what to do with a goal such as non zero(s(a)), which would otherwise succeed. Given that we think of the Herbrand Universe in this way, it seems natural to interpret universal quanti ers extensionally; i.e. that 8xp(x) should succeed precisely when p(t) succeeds for every term t in the Herbrand Universe. However, this is at variance with the standard practice in rst-order logic. For example, let the Herbrand Universe be fa; f(a); f(f(a)); : : :g and consider the program P below:
According to the standard rule, we only have P`8xp(x) when P`p(y) for some \new" variable y, and yet it is clear that for every term t in the Herbrand Universe P`p(t). We may think of this as requiring that universally quanti ed conclusions be independent of the language of the program. In our case we want the success of universally quanti ed goals to re ect the fact that we are dealing with a known Herbrand Universe, and so we will require something slightly di erent, i.e. that a universally quanti ed goal succeeds precisely when all of its instances succeed. However we will still retain the \compactness" of the previous version, in that success of a universally quanti ed goal will only depend on the success of a nite number of instances, and hence describes a feasible search operation. The precise details of how this is done are given below.
The second important point to note is that the Negation as Failure (NAF) rule relies on the information in the program being complete. For example, the append predicate given below is complete in the sense that there is no additional clause we can insert which would correctly extend the append relation; all the information we ever want to consider about appending lists together is given, and so it is correct to apply NAF. Thus we may think of the append predicate as given below as completely de ned. 8x append( ]; x; x) 8x8y8z8w append(x:y; z; x:w) append(y; z; w)
On the other hand, not every predicate will have such a complete de nition. For example, a predicate containing information about carcinogens we would wish to consider incompletely de ned, as it is possible that our list of carcinogens is not complete. This process seems somewhat incompatible with the notion of a completely de ned predicate. As pointed out by Gabbay 7] , mixing the notions of NAF and embedded implications can cause the rule of modus ponens to fail. Hence it would seem natural to insist that not only must a predicate be completely de ned before we can apply the NAF rule to it, but also that a predicate must be incompletely de ned before we can add to its de nition in the program. Thus we syntactically separate the predicates for which we may use NAF from those for which we may use embedded implication.
Hence when it comes to de ning programs, we will require that programs consist of more than just a set of closed de nite clauses, as we need to know which predicates are completely de ned. In fact, we will include a pair of disjoint sets of predicates names as part of the program, where the rst set of names are the predicates which are incompletely de ned, and the second are the completely de ned predicates. This allows us to make some signi cant technical simpli cations. Whilst we insist that the two sets be disjoint, it is not necessary that the two sets cover all predicate names, as there may be some predicates whose status is somewhat unclear (i.e. it is possible that the de nition is complete, but we do not know that it is complete). Thus the rst set of names may be thought of as those predicates for which we know our information is incomplete, and hence it is reasonable to extend the de nition of such predicates during execution of the program, but not to apply the NAF rule to them. On the other hand, the completely de ned predicates may use the NAF rule, but their de nitions may not be extended.
This leads us to the de nition of a program which appears below.
De nition 2.2 Given an atom A = p(t 1 ; : : :t n ), we de ne name(A) = p, and for any formula F, names(F ) = fname(A) j A appears in Fg.
We say an atom A appears positively (negatively) in a formula F as follows: Note that whilst we are ultimately interested in the properties of programs and goals (in which there are no free variables), in general we will need to consider sets of de nite formulae and goal formulae which are not closed. This is due to the occurrence of universal quanti ers and implications in goals, which means that during computation we cannot restrict attention purely to closed goal formulae or closed de nite formulae. For this reason we introduce the notion of a derivation state. The restrictions on the occurrences of atoms in the bodies of the clauses of completely de ned predicates ensure that completely de ned predicates may only depend on the success of other completely de ned predicates and the assumption of incompletely de ned predicates. For example, given the clause p (r q) then if den(N) contains p, then it must contain q and ass(N) must contain r.
Clearly this property of programs will be maintained throughout execution provided that additions to the program only extend incompletely de ned predicates.
We shall nd the following de nition useful.
De nition 2.4 Let G be a G HHF ? goal formula. We say G is negatable i all predicates which occur positively in G are completely de ned, and all predicates which occur negatively in G are incompletely de ned.
In the next section we will show how we can use these notions to de ne an operational notion of consequence.
Operational Provability
In order to use the class of programs introduced in the previous section as a logic programming language, we need to provide a notion of operational provability. We will do so by introducing two relations`s and`f , where the former is used to indicate success and hence will be similar to the`o relation of 14], and the latter is used to indicate failure. There will be some interplay between the two relations, as we wish to identify P`s :A with P`f A when name(A) is a completely de ned predicate.
As mentioned above, we are interested in validity with respect to a given set of ground terms U. In the presence of the Negation as Failure rule, this raises some compactness problems. For example, it seems natural to state that the goal 9x p(x) fails i p(t) fails for each t 2 U. However, this can lead to some technical complications, and is somewhat at variance with what happens in Prolog. Consider the program 8x p(s(x)) p(x) q 9x p(x) where the Herbrand Universe is f0; s(0); s(s(0)); : : :g. According to the rule just mentioned above, q fails. However, a Prolog system will not return an answer for the goal q. The problem is that we need more than ! steps in order to show that q fails. Whilst this in itself is not an insurmountable problem, it seems more appropriate (and more elegant) to alter the de nition of failure so that q neither fails nor succeeds. Hence we will need an extra condition, in that not only must we have that every ground instance p(t) of p(x) fails, but also that they do so compactly, i.e. that there is a nite set of instances which fail, and the failure of this nite set of instances implies the failure of all ground instances. For this reason we will need to consider arbitrary terms, and not just ground terms, in the de nition of failure for existentially quanti ed goals. A formal de nition is given below.
We will assume that the number of symbols in the Herbrand universe is nite, and so we may associate a signature with U. This signature will be denoted as .
We also assume the existence of a countably in nite set of variables disjoint from the set of constants and function symbols of all signatures.
De nition 3.1 Let be a signature containing at least one constant symbol.
Terms are de ned as follows:
A variable or a constant in is a term If f is an n-ary function symbol in and t 1 ; : : : t n are terms, then f(t 1 ; : : :t n ) is a term.
Nothing else is a term.
The Herbrand universe U is the set of all ground terms which may be formed from the symbols in .
We denote by T the set of all terms which may be formed from the symbols in . Note that U is the set of all ground terms, whereas T is the set of all terms. We think of each of the variables appearing in a term in T as ranging over elements of U, so that we think of T as a more sophisticated representation of the same set of terms. Thus the non-ground terms in T do not have any deep meaning; they merely act as place holders.
As mentioned above, we wish to de ne the failure of existentially quanti ed goals (and also the success of universally quanti ed goals) by way of a nite set of \representative" instances, rather than by way of all ground instances (which is generally in nite). In order so to do, below we introduce the notion of a representation.
De nition 3.2 A covering set of U is a set of terms T such that t 2 U i t is a ground instance of a term t 0 2 T.
A minimal covering set is a covering set of which no proper subset is a covering set.
A representation of U is a nite minimal covering set of U. We refer to the set of all representations of U as R(U). We may now state that 9xG fails if there is a representation R such that G t=x] fails for all t 2 R. This essentially guarantees a continuity property, in that 9xG only fails when there is a nite set of instances of G that fails. Consider again the above example. As any representation must contain a term of the form s n (y) for some n, for 9xp(x) to fail we must have that p(y) fails. However it seems that any reasonable de nition of failure would not allow p(y) to fail in this instance, as it \matches" a clause in the program which generates the same goal. Hence as p(y) does not fail (even though every ground instance of it does), 9xp(x) does not fail.
We will de ne the success of universally quanti ed goals in a similar way, i.e. that 8xG succeeds i there is a representation R such that G t=x] succeeds for all t 2 R. Note that as a term in a representation may contain variables, we will have to consider the possibility that variables may occur in atoms, and hence take this into account in the de nition of success and failure for atoms. As we desire the failure of G t=x] for all t 2 R to be at least as strong a condition as the failure of G t=x] for all t 2 U, it seems natural to expect that the former property implies the latter. Similarly it seems natural to expect that if G t=x] succeeds for all t 2 R then G t=x] succeeds for all t 2 U. Thus the success or failure of the instances of an atom shall be our guiding intuition in the relevant de nitions of success and failure, and so it seems natural to adopt the policy that an atom succeeds if every instance of it succeeds, and an atom fails if every instance of it fails. However this is not quite su cient for our purposes. Ultimately, we are interested in the validity of sentences, i.e. whether a given set of closed de nite formulae implies a given closed goal formula. Free variables and the like are merely tools used in the derivation process. Hence we are not interested in the validity of formulae containing free variables per se, but only in using the success or failure of such formulae to determine the validity of sentences. Thus we know that any free variable in a derivation must be introduced by a quanti er, which allows us to simplify the de nition of success for an atom. For example, let be fa=0; f=1g (so that the Herbrand Universe consists of a; f(a); f 2 (a); : : :), and consider the program p(a)
As p(a) and p(f(y)) succeed, we have that 8x p(x) succeeds. On the other hand, it is less clear what we should expect for p(z). It is clear that every (proper) instance of p(z) succeeds (i.e. that p(a) and p(f(y)) succeed for any y), which suggests that p(z) should succeed. However this means that the de nition of success for an atom may be somewhat complicated, as we may have to \split" p(z) into a number of instances. This also means that for a goal such as 8x p(x) there are two \layers" of universal quanti cation { one being the explicit quanti er and the other being the implicit quanti cation given by the occurrence of free variables in terms such as p(f(y)). Hence we shall de ne the success of an atom as above and in 14], i.e. in terms of the atom itself, rather than its instances. Thus in the above example, 8x p(x) succeeds, but p(z) does not. In this way the de nition of success and failure for atoms may appear to be somewhat asymmetric, but as we are ultimately interested only in closed formulae, this will not be of great concern.
Note that the traditional de nition of success for 8xG may be thought of as utilizing only the representation fyg of U. Thus our de nition of success for 8xG seems a natural extension when considering validity with respect to a given Herbrand Universe.
The An O-proof is an O-derivation whose root is positive and whose leaves are initial. An O-denial is an O-derivation whose root is negative and whose leaves are initial.
We may think of proofs in this system as trees whose nodes are sequents, where each sub-tree is classi ed as either a \success" sub-tree or a \fail" sub-tree, and so this is a generalisation of the concept of an SLDNF-tree 12].
Note the case for negation for ?! + , which ensures that the NAF rule is only applied to completely de ned predicates of P, i.e. those whose names appear in den(N). We do not insist on the same restriction for the failure of :A as it seems reasonable for :A to fail whenever A succeeds, regardless of whether name(A) is a completely de ned predicate or not. As negation is only applied to literals, all this does is allow more things to fail than would be the case otherwise. For example, given the program P = hp; hfpg; ;ii, we have that P`s p, and so it seems reasonable that we have that P`f :p, even though p is not completely de ned. Thus the success of an atom implies the failure of its negation, but the failure of an atom doesn't necessarily imply the success of its negation.
Note also that the implication rule has to be slightly modi ed so that only predicates in ass(N) may be extended. There may be less restrictive ways of dealing with this problem; this way ensures that only assumptions known to be consistent with the program are allowed to be made, and that a goal of the form D G for which D is an extension of the de nition of a predicate not in ass(N) is computationally indeterminate. Without this restriction, computation of the goal append( ]; ]; 1; 2; 3]) G from the standard append program (i.e. the two standard clauses with append being completely de ned) involves a program which extends the de nition of append, and so it is not obvious what the computational behaviour should be. We do not pursue this problem here; for now, we note that the present way of dealing with the problem is \safe", in that inconsistencies of this kind are avoided.
It should also be noted that this form of the implication rule is not a conservative extension of the implication rule for`o 14], in that it is not the case that hp p; h;; fpgii`s p p, due to the fact that p is completely de ned, and hence the antecedent of the goal cannot be added to the program. However, it is not hard to see that for a program P = hD; Ni and a goal G in which all predicates which occur negatively in G are in ass(N) that D`o G implies that P`s G. In particular, if G is a goal in which all negatively occurring predicates are in ass(N) and positive occurrences of a universal quanti er are not allowed in goals, it should be clear that D`o G i P`s G. Hence ass(N) may be used to identify formulae for which`s conservatively extends`o. We shall see how this device is useful later. Clearly a conservative extension is desirable and would simplify the de nitions of`s and`f, but raises some di cult problems for the model theory. Since it seems problematic for the model theory to cope with extensions to completely de ned predicates, we place this restriction here to avoid considering cases which are semantically meaningless. We may think of this restriction (i.e. that predicates occurring in a negative position in a goal must appear in ass(N) for the goal to succeed or fail) as insisting that additions to the program must be known to be consistent with the program, just as we insist that to use NAF we must know that the predicate involved cannot be consistently extended. In this way this restriction, whilst somewhat undesirable, does seem to be in keeping with our approach.
Note that there are programs and goals for which neither P`s G nor P`f G. For example, if P = hp p; h;; ;ii and G = p, then it is clear that P 6 s p and P 6 f p.
The following proposition shows how`s and`f may be thought of in a more inductive style. 
Now fa; f(y)g is a representation, and p(a) and p(f(y)) both succeed, but p(y) does not succeed. This result cannot be extended to D HHF ? formulae either, as for the above program, :p(y) does not fail, although :p(a) and :p(f(y)) both do. Full discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this paper; further discussion may be found in 9].
The intuitive reading of P`s G and P`f G may be given as \G succeeds" and \G fails"
respectively. The validity of this interpretation is shown by the proposition below.
Proposition 3.4 Let hP; Gi be a derivation pair where P = hD; Ni. Then 1. P`s G ) P 6 f G 2. P`f G ) P 6 s G Proof: We proceed by simultaneous induction on the depth of the O-proof and O-denial for P`s G and P`f G. In the base case, the sequent is initial, and hence G is just an atom A. By the hypothesis this implies that it is not the case that P`f G t=x] for any t 2 U, and so it is impossible that P`f G t=x] for some t 2 U, i.e. it is not true that P`f 8xG.
2. P`f 8xG i P`f G t=x] for some t 2 U, and by the hypothesis, this implies that it is not the case that P`s G t=x] for some t 2 U. Now if 9R 2 R(U) such that P`s G t 0 =x] for all t 0 2 R, then by Proposition 3.2 P`s G t=x] for all t 2 U, as no variables of R appear free in P. Hence it is impossible that 9R 2 R(U) such that P`s G t=x] for all t 0 2 R, i.e. it is not true that P`s 8xG.
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Thus the above de nitions are consistent. Note that a similar result will hold for the case when universal quanti cation is interpreted intensionally (i.e. using the new constant rule).
This result suggests that it is consistent to de ne a more general form of negation. If we let G be a goal in which all predicates which occur in positive positions are in den(N) and all those in negative positions are in ass(N), then we may de ne an extension of the relations`s and`f as follows: P`s :G i P`f G P`f :G i P`s G From the above result we see that P`f G implies that P 6 s G, and so P`s :G is a consistent conclusion. A similar argument holds for the other case, and so this indicates how we may implement negation for a wider class of formulae than just atoms.
A Kripke-like Model
Having established a proof-theoretic notion of consequence, we now turn to nding a corresponding model-theoretic notion. In 14] it was shown how a Kripke-like model may be constructed for a large fragment of hereditary Harrop formulae, being the class of programs in which universal quanti ers are not allowed in goal formulae, using techniques inspired by the possible worlds approach of Kripke 17] . This construction was then shown to precisely model the computational behaviour of these formulae, just as the previous construction of Kowalski and van Emden 3] did for Horn clauses. We now look at how to extend the construction of 14] to cater for the inclusion of negation, and the inclusion of our notion of universally quanti ed goals.
We wish to extend the programs and goals covered by this model to D HHF ? and G HHF ?
formulae. The key technical features of the Kripke-like model of 14] are a set of worlds W together with a partial order on this set, and a consequence relation j = j = which relates intepretations, worlds and goals, i.e. we have I; w j = j = G for some interpretation I, world w and goal G. In 14] , worlds are just programs, and the partial ordering on them is set inclusion. It is then shown how to construct an interpretation J such that J; P j = j = G i P`o G.
In our case, we wish to alter the de nition of j = j = to include cases for universal quanti cation and negation. Using the notion of truth in a Kripke model as a guide, we desire something along the lines of: I; P j = j = 8xG i 8w 0 P we have I; w 0 j = j = G t=x] for each t 2 U It should be noted that a feature of the Kripke-like model which is not a general feature of Kripke models is that the \domain" of terms considered does not from world to world, but is constant for all worlds. Hence, we prefer to think of the Kripke-like model as one in which there are no new objects constructed in the process of increasing our knowledge (i.e. as we move upwards in the partial order on worlds). It is this possibility that necessitates the side conditions on the de nitions of truth in a Kripke model for the connectives 8; and : which state that the formula must not only be true in the current world but also true in every future world, as these are the ones which will be a ected if new objects are constructed at a later stage. The worlds structure of 14] may be thought of as circumventing this side condition for due to the fact that the partial order between worlds is just set inclusion Analogously, since we will never construct new objects, it should be possible to do the same for 8, so that we may replace the above de nition by the following:
I; P j = j = 8xG i I; P j = j = G t=x] for all t 2 U
We do not need to consider all worlds w 0 P here as we know that no new objects can be constructed, and so the Herbrand universe U is never increased.
A relevant observation at this point is that there are intermediate logics (i.e. strictly between intuitionistic logic and classical logic) which have model-theoretic properties very similar to that of the Kripke-like model. The best known example is called the logic of constant domains, whose models are characterised by Kripke models in which the terms \available" are the same at every world. Clearly the Kripke-like model is one such model, as U is xed for all worlds. However, the logic of constant domains is not quite right in our case, as we are interested in one particular domain, rather than a class of domains. Another classi cation of the logic of constant domains is to add the following axiom to intuitionistic logic: 8x( _ (x)) _ (8x ) where x does not occur free in . It should be noted that for a program P and a goal of the form 8x(G 1 _G 2 (x)) where x is not free in G 1 that P`s 8x(G 1 _G 2 (x)) i P`s G 1 _8xG 2 (x).
However, clearly this rule cannot be directly applied to de nite formulae, as such formulae do not contain positive occurrences of disjunctions. Nevertheless, this suggests that the natural place to study the semantics seems to be an intermediate logic, rather than intuitionistic logic. This point is taken up in another paper 8].
The way to de ne the condition for truth of a negated atom in this model is more problematic. The desired de nition of j = j = for negated formulae, again using the analogy of Kripke models, would be I; P j = j = :A i 8w 0 P we have I; w 0 6 j = j = A If the relation between worlds is set inclusion ( ), then there is no w and A such that J; w j = j = :A (for any \reasonable" interpretation J, i.e. one in which if A 2 P, then A 2 J(P). The reason is that the world w fAg is always reachable from w, and so there is always a world w 0 above w such that J; w 0 j = j = A. Thus in order to incorporate negated atoms into this model, we need to restrict the reachability relation between worlds, so that there are less worlds \above" a given world w.
It is not hard to see that such \ pruning" will be based around completely de ned predicates, in that no world above another world can extend the de nitions of the completely de ned predicates. Hence, we wish the reachability relation between worlds to re ect the following: w fDg is reachable from w i D does not contain any more information than w about the completely de ned predicates of w.
The notion of completely and incompletely de ned predicates is used to determine which worlds are reachable and which are not. If P contains an incompletely de ned predicate p, then we wish any world which extends the de nition of p to be reachable from P. On the other hand, any world which extends the de nition of a completely de ned predicate of P should not be reachable from P.
As discussed above, the partial order on these worlds will need to be something more restrictive than set inclusion. The natural partial order between worlds is given below.
De nition 4.1 Let P 1 and P 2 be sets of de nite formulae, and N i names(P i ) names(P i ), i = 1,2. Then hP 1 ; N 1 i hP 2 ; N 2 i i The fourth condition in the de nition of is the interesting one, as it ensures that no completely de ned predicate of P 1 is extended by P 2 . Recall that ass(N 1 ) \ den(N 1 ) = ;, and so the only permitted extensions are those which extend the de nitions of predicates which are known to be incompletely de ned.
For example, let P 1 be the two clauses for append given above, and let P 2 = P 1 fappend(nil; nil; 1; 2])g. The partial order for hP i ; hN; ;ii and hP i ; hN; fappendgii; i = 1; 2 is given in Figure 1 . An important technical di erence between our construction and that of 14] is that in our case we require three-valued interpretations 4] in order to specify what is true and what is false. Due to the possible occurrence of free variables in programs and goals, we also need to consider maps which range over sets of atoms which are not necessarily ground. In this way our construction will resemble that of 5]. As mentioned in 5], it seems unreasonable for p(x) to be true and p(a) to be false. We may circumvent this di culty by thinking of the ground instances of the atoms in the interpretation as the \real" items of interest, and the non-ground atoms as place-holders. This leads us to the following de nition of an interpretation. Let H 0 be the set of all atomic formulae. Let W be the set of all derivation states.
De nition 5.1 Let X be a set of atoms. We refer to the set of all instances of all elements of X as inst(X). Note that X inst(X).
We de ne X 1 X 2 as inst(X 1 ) inst(X 2 ). When X 1 is a singleton set fAg we will often write X 1 X 2 as A X 2 .
Let P be a derivation state. An interpretation is any function I : W ! H 0 H 0 satisfying the following conditions, where I(P) = hS; Fi: 1 Let I(w) = hS; Fi. We de ne pos(I)(w) = S and neg(I)(w) = F. We de ne I ? (w) = h;; ;i8w 2 W.
We think of pos(I) as specifying which atoms are true, and of neg(I) as specifying which atoms are false. Thus, we may think of the de nition of an interpretation given in 14] as the special case of our de nition obtained when neg(I)(w) = ; for any world w. The rst condition ensures that no atom is speci ed as being both true and false, and so this condition ensures that interpretations are internally consistent. The second condition is a generalisation of the previous condition of internal monotonicity. This is justi ed by the perception that as programs increase, the knowledge contained in the program cannot decrease, and so no extension to a program is allowed to decrease either the set of atoms known to be true or the set of atoms known to be false. Thus we preserve the principle of monotonicity of information.
We use the relation merely as a shorthand; this is a device which allows us to handle the non-ground atoms more easily.
It is not hard to de ne the usual partial order v on interpretations, and the operator u. The dual operator t provides a slight di culty as there is now no longer one maximal interpretation. This means that the obvious de nition of t may not lead to an interpretation, as if I i (w) = hS i ; F i i where i = 1; 2, then if inst(S 2 ) \ inst(F 1 ) 6 = ; or inst(S 1 ) \ inst(F 2 ) 6 = ;, the mapping (I 1 tI 2 )(w) = hS 1 S 2 ; F 1 F 2 i is not an interpretation as inst(pos(I 1 tI 2 )(w))\ inst(neg(I 1 t I 2 )(w)) 6 = ;. However, we may consider two interpretations I 1 and I 2 with this property as mutually inconsistent, and so we never wish to consider the mapping I 1 t I 2 as an interpretation. This consideration motivates the de nitions below.
De nition 5.2 Let I 1 , I 2 be interpretations. I 1 and I 2 are mutually consistent interpretations if for all worlds w we have inst(pos(I 1 )(w)) \ inst(neg(I 2 )(w)) = ; inst(neg(I 1 )(w)) \ inst(pos(I 2 )(w)) = ;
Otherwise, I 1 and I 2 are mutually inconsistent.
We de ne the relations and < and the operator u as follows: I 1 (w) I 2 (w) i pos(I 1 )(w) pos(I 2 )(w) and neg(I 1 )(w) neg(I 2 )(w) I 1 v I 2 i 8w 2 W we have I 1 (w) I 2 (w) (I 1 u I 2 )(w) = hinst(pos(I 1 )(w)) \ inst(pos(I 2 )(w)); inst(neg(I 1 )(w)) \ inst(neg(I 2 )(w))i If I 1 and I 2 are mutually consistent then we de ne the operator t as follows:
(I 1 t I 2 )(w) = hpos(I 1 )(w) pos(I 2 )(w); neg(I 1 )(w) neg(I 2 )(w)i In this case the interpretations do not form a lattice under the operations t and u, as there are an in nite number of maximal interpretations. For any two such maximal interpretations I 1 and I 2 with I 1 (P) = hS 1 ; H 0 nS 1 i and I 2 (P) = hS 2 ; H 0 nS 2 i such that S 1 6 = S 2 , then I 1 tI 2 is not an interpretation. However, it will be seen below that the formal results do not depend upon the interpretations forming a lattice, and so this will not be a problem. Now we come to the generalisation of the relation j = j = de ned in 14]. As there is both positive and negative information explicitly given in an interpretation, it seems natural to de ne two relations j = j = + and j = j = ? such that j = j = + is used for the positive information and j = j = ? for the negative information. These are de ned below. De nition 5.3 Let hP; Gi be a D HHF ? derivation pair where P = hD; Ni and I be an interpretation. Then I; P j = j = + A i A pos(I)(P) I; P j = j = + :A i A neg(I)(P) I; P j = j = + G 1 _ G 2 i I; P j = j = + G 1 or I; P j = j = + G 2 I; P j = j = + G 1^G2 i I; P j = j = + G 1 and I; P j = j = + G 2 I; P j = j = + 9xG i I; P j = j = + G t=x] for some t 2 U I; P j = j = + 8xG i 9R 2 R(U) such that I; P j = j = + G t=x] for all t 2 R where the variables in R do not appear free in P or G I; hD; Ni j = j = + D 0 G i I; hD fD 0 g; Ni j = j = + G and hD fD 0 g; Ni hD; Ni I; P j = j = ? A i A neg(I)(P) I; P j = j = ? :A i A pos(I)(P) I; P j = j = ? G 1 _ G 2 i I; P j = j = ? G 1 and I; P j = j = ? G 2 I; P j = j = ? G 1^G2 i I; P j = j = ? G 1 or I; P j = j = ? G 2 I; P j = j = ? 9xG i 9R 2 R(U) such that I; P j = j = ? G t=x] for all t 2 R where the variables in R do not appear free in P or G I; P j = j = ? 8xG i I; P j = j = ? G t=x] for some t 2 U I; hD; Ni j = j = ? D 0 G i I; hD fD 0 g; Ni j = j = ? G and hD fD 0 g; Ni hD; Ni It should be clear that these de nitions are similar to those of 14], with the main di erences being the cases for universal quanti cation, implication and negation. The motivation for the universal quanti cation case is clear from the earlier discussion on the corresponding operational de nition. In the case of 14] the side condition on implication is vacuously true, as D fD 0 g D. Here we explicitly require that hD fD 0 g; Ni be reachable from hD; Ni, i.e. that the new world is reachable from the rst. This may be thought of as ensuring that the assumption makes sense. This restriction is not strictly necessary, in that there may be weaker restrictions that work. However, this is a safe choice, and in our opinion a natural one.
One interesting thing to note is that given two interpretations I 1 and I 2 , we have that I 1 v I 2 i for all P and A we have I 1 ; P j = j = + A ) I 2 ; P j = j = + A and I 1 ; P j = j = + :A ) I 2 ; P j = j = + :A. This property will be useful in some subsequent proofs, as it allows us to deduce that if I 1 ; P j = j = + G ) I 2 ; P j = j = + G for any P and G, then I 1 v I 2 .
The following lemma establishes that interpretations respect the reachability relation between worlds.
Lemma 5.1 Let P 1 and P 2 be D HHF ? derivation states, G be a G HHF ? goal formula, and let I be an interpretation. If P 1 P 2 then 1. I; P 1 j = j = + G ) I; P 2 j = j = + G 2. I; P 1 j = j = ? G ) I; P 2 j = j = ? G Proof: We proceed by induction on the size of G. The base case occurs when G is a literal.
A: 1. I; P 1 j = j = + A implies that A pos(I)(P 1 ), and as inst(pos(I(P 1 ))) inst(pos(I(P 2 ))), we have I; P 2 j = j = + A. 2. I; P 1 j = j = ? A implies that A neg(I)(P 1 ), and as inst(neg(I(P 1 ))) inst(neg(I(P 2 ))), we have I; P 2 j = j = ? A. :A: As I; P j = j = + :A i I; P j = j = ? A and I; P j = j = + A i I; P j = j = ? :A, this case follows directly from the one above.
Hence we assume that the lemma is true for all goals of no more than a given size. There are ve cases; four of them are similar, and so we only present the argument for the cases G 1 _ G 2 and D G: G 1 _ G 2 : 1. I; P 1 j = j = + G 1 _ G 2 i I; P 1 j = j = + G 1 or I; P 1 j = j = + G 2 and by the hypothesis this implies that I; P 2 j = j = + G 1 or I; P 2 j = j = + G 2 , i.e. I; P 2 j = j = + G 1 _ G 2 . 2. I; P 1 j = j = ? G 1 _ G 2 i I; P 1 j = j = ? G 1 and I; P 1 j = j = ? G 2 and by the hypothesis this implies that I; P 2 j = j = ? G 1 and I; P 2 j = j = ? G 2 , i.e. I; P 2 j = j = ? G 1 _ G 2 . D 0 G: 1 In the light of Proposition 3.2, it should not be surprising that the following Lemma holds.
Lemma 5.3 Let hP; Gi be a derivation state, and let I be an interpretation. Then 1. I; P j = j = + G ) I; P j = j = + G t=x] for any t 2 U 2. I; P j = j = ? G ) I; P j = j = ? G t=x] for any t 2 U Next we show that interpretations conserve the consistency of j = j = + and j = j = ? . Lemma 5.4 Let I be an interpretation. Then there is no derivation pair hP; Gi such that I; P j = j = + G and I; P j = j = ? G The next lemma is important for the construction process, and may be easily established. 
. Hence 9k such that A 2 inst(F k ), and so inst(A) inst(F k ), which implies that A F k , i.e. I k ; P j = j = + :A. 2. As I; P j = j = ? A i I; P j = j = + :A and I; P j = j = ? :A i I; P j = j = + A, this follows from the above argument.
Hence the inductive hypothesis is that the lemma holds for all goals of no more than a given size. There are ve cases, most of which are similar, and so we only present the argument for the cases 9xG and D G. 9xG 0 :
1. As F 1 i=1 I i ; P j = j = + 9xG 0 , we have that F 1 i=1 I i ; P j = j = + G 0 x=t] for some t 2 U. By the hypothesis, I k ; P j = j = + G 0 x=t] for some k 1, and so we have I k ; P j = j = + 9xG 0 .
2. As F 1 i=1 I i ; P j = j = ? 9xG 0 , we have that 9R 2 R(U) such that F 1 i=1 I i ; P j = j = ? G 0 x=t] for all t 2 R, and so by the hypothesis, for each t 2 R there is a k t such that I kt ; P j = j = ? G 0 t=x]. Let k be the maximum of all the k t . Hence I k ; P j = j = ? G 0 t=x] for all t 2 R, and so we have I k ; P j = j = ? 9xG 0 .
D 0 G 0 : 
2
Note that this result depends critically on the compactness properties of goals containing quanti ers.
Thus our extended notion of interpretation preserves important semantic properties. We show in the next section how the important properties of the T ! (I ? ) construction are preserved as well.
A Fixed Point Construction
We wish to nd a single interpretation J such that P`s G i J; P j = j = + G and P`f G i J; P j = j = ? G. We proceed in a similar manner to that in 14], i.e. we build ordinal powers of a T operator, and use the union of all such powers to produce the desired interpretation.
De nition 6.1 Let I be an interpretation, and let w = hD; Ni be a D HHF ? derivation state.
Then we de ne pos(T(I))(w) = fA j A 2 jDj or 9G A 2 jDj such that I; w j = j = + Gg neg(T(I))(w) = fA j name(A) 2 den(N) and 8B 2 jDj B 6 / A and 8G B 2 jDj such that B / A we have I; w j = j = ? G g
For an example of how this process works, consider the program below. even(0) 8x even(s(x)) :even(x) Let P = hD; h;; fevengii where D is the code in the even program above. Then we have T 1 (I ? )(P) = hfeven(0)g; ;i T 2 (I ? )(P) = hfeven(0)g; feven(s(0))gi T 3 (I ? )(P) = hfeven)(0); even(s 2 (0))g; feven(s(0))gi T 4 (I ? )(P) = hfeven)(0); even(s 2 (0))g; feven(s(0)); even(s 3 (0))gi : : :
Note that even(x) neither succeeds nor fails, as there are some instances of it which succeed and some which fail.
In this way we may think of the powers of T as using the program to de ne an increasing sequence of interpretations which is used to model the behaviour of the program. The nal interpretation in this sequence (i.e. T ! (I ? )) can indeed be shown to capture this operational behaviour.
It is not hard to show that T is indeed a mapping from interpretations to interpretations, i.e., that if I is an interpretation, then so is T(I).
Thus the construction gives us an increasing sequence of interpretations. It is also not hard to show that T is monotonic and continuous. 
w: If A 2 pos(T( F 1 i=1 I i ))(P), then either A 2 jDj, in which case A 2 T(I j )(P) for all j 0, or 9G A 2 jDj such that F 1 i=1 I i ; P j = j = + G, which by lemma 5.6 implies that I j ; P j = j = + G for some j 0, and so A 2 pos(S(I j ))(P). In either case we have A 2 pos( F 1 i=1 T(I i ))(P). If A 2 neg(T( F 1 i=1 I i ))(P), then name(A) 2 den(N) and 8B 2 jDj B 6 / A and 8G B 2 jDj such that B / A, F 1 i=1 I i ; P j = j = ? G, which by lemma 5.6 implies that I j ; P j = j = ? G for some j 0, and so A 2 neg(T(I j ))(P). Hence A 2 neg( F 1 i=1 T(I i ))(P). Thus even though our partial order does not form a lattice, our operator is continuous and T ! (I ? ) is its least xed point. This result may be seen as evidence that our approach does not stray too wildly from the traditional methods.
We now show the relationship between our construction and the relations`s and`f. First we show that`s and`f are sound with respect to the Kripke-like model.
The reader may wish to refer to De nition 2.4. B 2 jDj such that B / A, P`f G, and as G is negatable, by the hypothesis, T ! (I ? ); P j = j = ? G. By lemma 5.6 we have that T k (I ? ); P j = j = ? G for some k, and so T k+1 (I ? ); P j = j = ? A, i.e. T ! (I ? ); P j = j = ? A. :A: 1. P`s :A i P`f A and name(A) 2 den(N), and by the hypothesis, T ! (I ? ); P j = j = ? A.
By lemma 5.6, we have that T k (I ? ); P j = j = ? A for some k, and so T k (I ? ); P j = j = + :A, i.e. T ! (I ? ); P j = j = + :A. 2. P`f :A i P`s A, and by the hypothesis, T ! (I ? ); P j = j = + A. By lemma 5.6, we have that T k (I ? ); P j = j = + A for some k, and so T k (I ? Note that this result may be thought of as demonstrating the compactness of`s and`f, in that if P`s G, then T ! (I ? ); P j = j = + G, and by Lemma 5.6 T k (I ! ); P j = j = + G for some k, and similarly for`f when G is negatable.
Next we show that operational provability is complete with respect to the Kripke-like model. Proposition 6.8 Let hP; Gi be a D HHF ? derivation pair where P = hD; Ni. Then 1. T ! (I ? ); P j = j = + G ) P`s G 2. T ! (I ? ); P j = j = ? G ) P`f G Proof: By lemma 5.6 we have that T ! (I ? ); P j = j = + G ) 9k such that T k (I ? ); P j = j = + G T ! (I ? ); P j = j = ? G ) 9k such that T k (I ? ); P j = j = ? G
In each case, let k be the smallest such number.
We proceed to show 1 & 2 simultaneously by formal induction on the ordinal measure !:k + n, where n is the number of connectives in G.
The base case occurs when n = 1 and k = 0.
T 1 (I ? ); P j = j = + A implies that A jDj, i.e. A 2 jDj, and hence P`s A. T 1 (I ? ); P j = j = ? A implies that 8B 2 jDj and 8G B 2 jDj, B 6 / A, and so P`f A.
Hence we assume that the proposition is true for all programs and goals for which !:k+n does not exceed a certain value. There are seven cases; as above, these are somewhat repetitive, and so we only give the argument below for the cases A, :A and D G. A: 1. T k (I ? ); P j = j = + A implies that 9G A 2 jDj such that T k?1 (I ? ); P j = j = + G, and by the hypothesis, P`s G, and so P`s A.
2. T k (I ? ); hD; Ni j = j = ? D 0 G i T k (I ? ); hD fD 0 g; Ni j = j = ? G and hD fD 0 g; Ni hD; Ni, and by the hypothesis this implies that hD fD 0 g; Ni`f G and names(heads(D 0 )) ass(N), i.e. hD; Ni`f D 0 G. We have seen how the Negation as Failure rule may be incorporated into the framework of hereditary Harrop formulae, and how this extension is more intricate than in some other cases due to the possibility that the program may grow during execution. We have also seen how consideration of how to implement universal quanti ers in goals in uences the technical choices to be made, and how we may make both of these extensions compact. We have also seen how a Kripke-like model may be constructed in such a way that truth in the model corresponds to derivability from programs. The fact that this construction takes at most ! iterations may be seen as evidence of the compactness of our approach. This property is essentially due to our treatment of non-ground terms, in that we do not consider only the ground instances of a program, but all instances, including both ground and non-ground ones. Whilst our notion of universal quanti cation has been extensional, it should not be hard to derive similar results for the intensional case. Indeed, given de nitions of`s and`f which use the intensional version, and corresponding alterations to j = j = + and j = j = ? , the results stated herein will, it seems, all still hold. Thus we may think of our approach, in this limited sense at least, being parameterised by the choice of consequence relation.
We have seen how inconsistencies, such as extending the de nition of completely de ned predicates, causes some problems from the model-theoretic point of view, but the operational (or proof-theoretic) one does not have such problems. Whilst the notion of completely de ned predicates seems natural enough, the corresponding restrictions on the operational concepts does not seem as natural. This suggests that our approach to model theory may need to become more sophisticated in order to deal with inconsistent programs. A similar remark may be made about extending the class of programs to include negations which occur positively in programs, such as in the \program" fp; :pg.
One feature of the Kripke-like model is that it naturally incorporates the notion of extensions to the program, and so it may be useful for studying the formal development of programs. Another interesting area of investigation is to use this model as a way of investigating the \natural" logic in which to interpret hereditary Harrop formulae. It is known that this logic is slightly stronger than intuitionistic logic 8]; the proof-theory of this logic is as yet somewhat unnatural, and so the Kripke-like model seems a likely way to investigate this logic. The main di erence between this logic and intuitionistic logic is that we require the Independence of Premise (IP) axioms to hold. These axioms are often studied in conjunction with Markov's Principle (MP) (which may be stated as ::A ) A), which seems appropriate for NAF. Thus it would seem that the natural logic for hereditary Harrop formulae with NAF is the intermediate logic found by adding IP and MP to intuitionistic logic. This theme will be taken up in a later paper.
